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With their flexible legal framework, friendly settlements (‘FS’) before the European
Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) have proved helpful in managing the Court’s
ever-growing caseload of individual applications (Keller et al., pp. 49 ff). In inter-
State cases, given the more evenly distributed power balance between the parties
– and the political dimension of these types of disputes – one might expect FS
to be equally prevalent. In principle, this classic instrument of international law
seems even better suited to inter-State proceedings than a judgment would be.
However, only two FS have been reached in the context of inter-State cases before
the ECtHR to date, namely in France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands v.
Turkey and Denmark v. Turkey.The reason why FS have not played a major role
in inter-State cases before the Strasbourg Court so far is that the willingness of
the parties to negotiate, let alone to agree on the terms of a FS, poses a particular
challenge. However, FS offer many advantages in this context. This post argues that
there is room for FS in inter-State proceedings and suggests how this mechanism
can play a more prominent role in the future.
Multiple Possibilities for a Friendly Settlement
The legal basis for FS is contained in Article 39 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (‘ECHR’), which imposes few legal requirements in terms of content
and procedure. Accordingly, proceedings before the Court can be terminated by
a FS at several stages during the course of an inter-State proceeding (see for
a chart with regard to friendly settlements in individual applications Keller et al.,
p. 300). Although the first opportunity to settle a case arises after an application
has been registered, it is unlikely that the parties will have an interest in entering
negotiations at this early stage. This is due to the fact that the further course of
the case is still unclear at this point, given that the Court has not yet declared the
application admissible (whether in full or in part). Such initial reluctance towards
negotiations may change once the application has passed the admissibility stage.
At this point, the scope of the case has been determined and the parties might have
astronger incentive to negotiate. If the parties remain unable to reach an agreement,
and the Court issues a judgment on the merits, but adjourns the question of just
satisfaction under Article 41 ECHR, a third possibility for a FS opens up. One might
expect a so-called ‘follow-up FS’ to be likely under these circumstances, given
that only financial issues remain to be decided and alleged Convention violations are
no longer the subject of the dispute. Although it would also be possible to settle a
case between its referral to the Grand Chamber and the resulting judgment, at this
point the parties are presumably more interested in having their dispute adjudicated
than in negotiating. Finally, another possibility should be considered, whereby a FS
would technically not resolve an inter-State case but instead address the individual
applications arising from an inter-State conflict (see below for the ‘Model FS’).
- 1 -
Indispensable Task Sharing
There are various advantages to resolving a case through a FS. First, the
terms are likely to be better implemented than a judgment would be, because
a settlement agreement reflects the common will of the parties and allows for
tailored measures. Considering that it may take the Court years to rule on the
admissibility alone, FS are likely to be reached faster than a judgment would
be rendered. Moreover, the parties may appreciate the confidentiality of the
proceedings which is foreseen by Article 39 (2) ECHR, the fact that the amicable
resolution of a dispute attracts less attention and, last but not least, that a resolution
by FS is not listed in the Court’s statistics as a violation of the Convention (Keller et
al., p. 58).
However, reaching a FS in inter-State cases is particularly challenging, as a
settlement depends entirely on the will of the conflicted States Parties. What is
more, managing such negotiations presents a difficult diplomatic mission for the
Court. Not only does the Court lack the necessary resources and experience to
function as a negotiator in politically complex situations, but it is already burdened
by the massive backlog ofindividual applications. It therefore makes little sense to
further increase the Court’s workload by burdening it with yet another expectation
for which it is not equipped. Thus, if the aim is to encourage the conclusion of future
inter-State FS with reasonable effort, it is crucial to be clear about what the Court
can in fact manage and what parts of the proceedings need to be accomplished by
the States Parties. While the Court is not able to assume a leading role in the FS
negotiations, it can assist by providing the initial impetus and creating a suitable
framework for the negotiations. However, the States Parties should largely conduct
the actual negotiations by themselves.
Such task sharing could be implemented through a multi-stage procedure that could
take place at any of the various moments at which a FS is possible, as mentioned
in the previous section. Hence, it should be the responsibility of the Court to pro-
actively reach out to the parties when there are indications that a settlement may be
an option. Since encouraging States Parties to engage in a dialogue is a delicate
undertaking, the Court should prepare its Registry on how it can appropriately
perform this function. In particular, such effortsshould not simply be initiated at any
given time. Rather, the Court needs to focus on key moments and be aware of the
fact that the chances for successful negotiations can improve considerably over
time. For example, the prospect of a FS in an inter-State case that has long been
pending before the Court might gain new momentum with changes in domestic
government. However, the most essential feature of the Court’s assistance must
be to provide the parties with procedural stability and a balanced framework as
a starting point for their negotiations. This requires a roadmap that sets out the
necessary cornerstones and a clear timetable for negotiations. Such a roadmap
needs to be standardized so that it can be adapted to different situations and
ease the Court’s workload as much as possible. The conduct of the negotiations
themselves would in turn fall to the States. The involvement of external experts
might be useful at this stage but would have to be approached cautiously due to the
mutually confidential and political nature of the negotiations.
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Once the States Parties have been able to agree on a proposal for a FS, they
may bring this before the Court. According to Article 39(1) ECHR, the Court will then
review the content of the settlement for its compatibility with the Convention and
its Protocols. At this point, the Court faces considerable pressure, as the FS is the
result of cumbersome negotiations between the States Parties. Hence, the Court
must be particularly cautious not to rubber-stamp serious human rights violations
in favor of political expediency. Indeed, the first inter-State FS – reached under the
Commission in 1985 and concerning an application brought by France, Norway,
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands against Turkey – demonstrated that this
concern is not merely theoretical (Keller et al. p. 74, Orakhelashvili, p. 258). With
this FS, the human rights at issue were not effectively served, neither by Turkey’s
assurance of non-repetition and its promise to keep the Commission informed on
human rights issues, nor by the declaration that it hoped to soon lift martial law
(France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands v. Turkey, paras. 37 et seq).
“Model Friendly Settlement”
Another area where the use of FS may be of particular benefit does not relate
directly to inter-State applications, but to individual follow-up cases. Such follow-
up cases are connected to an inter-State application and are normally postponed
until the Court has ruled on the main issues of the inter-State case. They impose a
difficult management task on the Court, not least because they can vary widely in
terms of their allegations. This means that there is neither a “one size fits all” nor an
automatic solution to individual applications. However, the roadmap that we suggest
and that would be provided by the Court could define several “model FS” for follow-
up cases, which applicants could be incentivized to accept by being offered a slightly
higher sum of money than what a violation judgment would provide. These model
FS would technically no longer constitute an inter-State FS. However, in order to
make this mechanism as effective as possible, a clause should be included in the
inter-State FS, according to which the States Parties should strongly encourage
the affected individuals to accept the model FS. It goes without saying that both
the States Parties and the Court must be careful not to put undue pressure on
individuals, as this would violate their right to bring an application before the Court
under Article 34 ECHR.
Outlook
There is undoubtedly room for a better and wider use of FS in inter-State
cases. While the willingness of the States Parties to negotiate should not be
overestimated, this challenge can be addressed by creating an adequate framework
that provides sufficient guidance to the parties without depriving the instrument of its
flexibility.
The question of how pro-active the Court should be in FS proceedings is pivotal. The
Court is not generally equipped to act as a diplomatic mediator, but it can provide
effective support in particular by setting guardrails. Apart from that, the Court can
mainly serve as a kind of safety net, which ensures that not just any agreement puts
an end to the proceedings.
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If FS do play a more important role in future inter-State cases, further questions
will have to be addressed. A key consideration is whether the purpose of FS in
this area should be limited to monetary compensation or include more “creative”
measures, such as those sometimes proposed in pilot judgments. The broader use
of FS depends ultimately on the Court’s vision for this instrument, namely whether it
considers it first and foremost as a mere tool to reduce the backlog of applications
and improve its statistics or as an instrument to preserve the European public order.
The latter would undoubtedly be a much more ambitious aim.
Finally, whether a FS can or should be the solution of a particular inter-State case
depends greatly on the nature of the application. Similar to individual applications,
the use of this instrument might prove particularly successful, on the one hand, when
FS relate to pecuniary issues, such as in the recent application of Liechtenstein
against the Czech Republic. In such circumstances, it is conceivable that the Court
can provide effective assistance that will significantly promote the success of a
FS. This is likely to be different, on the other hand, in situations essentially relating
to unresolved political problems between States, such as in Ukraine v.Russia (re
Crimea). All in all, one should be careful not to overwhelm the Court with tasks that
are essentially not judicial.
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